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Since September 2000, Israel and the Palestinians have been engaged in a deadly conflict, commonly known as the Second (or "al-Aqsa") Intifada, which has claimed more than 1,000
Israeli and 3,300 Palestinian lives. In previous work (David A. Jaeger and M. Daniele Paserman, 2005 , henceforth JP), we showed that the conventional wisdom that the two sides are locked in an endless cycle of violence, where actions by one side are always followed by retaliations from the other, followed by counter-retaliations ad infinitum, does not appropriately capture the dynamics of the conflict. Rather, Israel responds in a predictable and systematic way to Palestinian violence, while the Palestinians' actions do not seem to be related to past levels of Israeli violence, either through revenge, deterrence or incapacitation. In that analysis, we treated the Palestinians as a unified entity, but to understand the dynamics of the relationship better, it may be necessary to take into account that a number of different Palestinian factions engage in Several previous papers have modeled the strategic interplay between moderate and radical groups in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict or other armed struggles between insurgents and a central government. These papers have different predictions for the timing and magnitude of violent actions and for the identity of the groups carrying out the attacks. Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter (2002) argue that extremist violence is not indiscriminate or irrational, but rather is timed to coincide with major developments in a peace process, with the aim of sabotaging diplomatic efforts. In contrast, Mia M. Bloom (2004) emphasizes the role of political competition between the different Palestinian factions, claiming that they use suicide bombings as a means to boost prestige and popularity. Robert A. Pape (2003) and Claude Berrebi and Esteban Klor (2005) argue instead that Palestinian groups use violence to extract territorial concessions from Israel. In Berrebi and Klor's model, the radical group (Hamas) always chooses to exercise violence, while the moderate Palestinian Authority, whose goal is to achieve emancipation for the occupied territories, can choose either to fight the radical group and attempt 3 to thwart terrorist attacks, or to allow these attacks and thus increase the expected level of terrorist activity. A variety of other studies examine antiterrorism policies and their effectiveness (Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, 1993; Bryan Brophy-Baermann and John A. C. Conybeare, 1994; and Asaf Zussman and Noam Zussman, forthcoming) . None of these studies, however, addresses the possibility that Israel's actions may also be strategic, and that it may choose to act differently in response to violence by different factions. Here we directly and empirically explore this possibility, and test whether the magnitude and the targets of Israel's response to Palestinian violence depends on the identity of the factions claiming responsibility for the attacks.
I. Data and Descriptive Statistics
We rely on two sources for data: the web site of B'tselem (http://www.btselem.org), an Israeli human rights organization, and the database on incidents and casualties in the Second Intifada prepared by the Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel (http://www.ict.org.il).
In the statistics section of its Hebrew web site, B'tselem records in detail every fatality on both sides of the conflict during the second Intifada.
2 The data include the date and the circumstances of the fatal wounding, the name, age, sex and locality of residence of the victim.
For Israelis, the site records whether the fatality was a civilian or a member of the security forces; for Palestinians, the site records whether the fatality was involved in combat or not, and whether it belonged to the Israeli Army's "wanted" list. Among the advantages of this data set are its comprehensiveness and the symmetrical treatment of both sides of the conflict. More 4 importantly, the information published by B'tselem is widely thought to be accurate and reliable. In Table 1 , we present the distribution of Palestinian fatalities by combatant status and organizational affiliation. 5 Roughly 45 percent of all Palestinian fatalities were combatants, 42 percent were noncombatants, and the combatant status of the remainder was unknown. We were able to identify the organizational affiliation of more than 60 percent of combatants: of these, 3 From the B'tselem website: "B'Tselem has attained a prominent place among human rights organizations. In December, 1989 it received the Carter-Menil Award for Human Rights. Its reports have gained B'Tselem a reputation for accuracy, and the Israeli authorities relate to them seriously. B'Tselem ensures the reliability of information it publishes by conducting its own fieldwork and research, whose results are thoroughly cross-checked with relevant documents, official government sources, and information from other sources, among them Israeli, Palestinian, and other human rights organizations." 4 The match rate was more than 99 percent among Israeli fatalities, and more than 72 percent among Palestinian fatalities. 5 A Palestinian was defined as a combatant if he was listed as a combatant in the ICT data, or if his combatant status was unknown in the ICT and he was listed as a combatant in the B'tselem data. Similarly, a Palestinian was defined as non-combatant if he was listed as a noncombatant in the ICT data, or if his combatant status was unknown in the ICT data and he was listed as a noncombatant in the B'tselem data. Finally, an individual's combatant status was recorded as unknown if information on combatant status was missing in both the ICT and the B'tselem data.
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roughly half belonged to one of the groups affiliated with Fatah, a third belonged to Hamas, and about a sixth belonged to PIJ.
We present the distribution of Israeli fatalities, by the faction claiming responsibility for the fatal attack in 
where F t is the incidence of fatalities of combatants from Fatah on day t,
F is the number of days with Israeli fatalities claimed by Fatah in the first seven-day period prior to day t, and !
I (t"8 to t"14 )
F is the number of days with Israeli fatalities claimed by Fatah in the second seven-day 6 period prior to day t. The other variables are defined similarly, and represent the lagged number of days with Israeli fatalities claimed by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other combatant groups. To parsimoniously control for serial correlation in Israel's actions, we also include variables for the lagged number of days with any Palestinian fatalities, P (t-1 to t-8) and P (t-1 to t-8) .
Lastly, the vector X t is a set of day-of-week and period-of-conflict variables as well as a variable measuring the length of the separation barrier between the West Bank and Israel. We define these variables and explore a variety of functional form issues (to which the results are robust) in JP.
We define Israel's reaction function against the other factions similarly, with only the dependent variable changing, and also include regressions for Palestinian fatalities that are characterized as non-combatants and whose combatant status is unknown. The regressions are estimated as linear probability models and because the error terms in the different reaction functions are likely to be correlated, we treat them as a set of seemingly unrelated regressions.
The estimated standard errors are also heteroskedasticity-consistent.
We present the results of estimating the Israeli reaction functions against the different factions in Table 3 . For comparison purposes, in the last column we present results using the incidence of all Palestinian fatalities as the dependent variable. In addition to the coefficient estimates, in each column we present χ 2 statistics for the joint statistical significance of all of the faction coefficients as well as only the "own" coefficients of the faction under examination. If the regressors are orthogonal to the error term in this regression, we can interpret these as testing shows that Israel's reaction against Fatah varies depending on which faction was responsible for past Israeli fatalities, while we cannot reject that Israel's reaction against Hamas is independent of the faction claiming responsibility for the attacks.
We have estimated similar models examining the reactions of the Palestinian factions to Israeli violence. As for the general results presented in JP, we find little evidence that there is any relationship between Israeli violence and a response by any of the factions. These results are not presented here due to space constraints and are available from the authors by request.
III. Discussion
Why does Israel react differently to the various factions? We conjecture that Israel's incentives to react may differ because of the contrasting long-term objectives of the Palestinian factions as well as their different organizational structures. The relatively moderate Fatah has endorsed the two-state approach to the solution of the conflict, has been the primary negotiator with Israel over that solution, and is likely to play a major role in representing the Palestinians at any future negotiations. Whether it engages in violence to extract territorial concessions or to boost its prestige and popularity among the Palestinian public, its choices on the timing and magnitude of the attacks are strategic, and there is likely to be a scope for deterrent actions by 9
Israel. Israel has the organization and technical means to respond quickly when Fatah claims responsibility for an attack, and it also has an incentive to respond directly and in a timely way, to make obvious that it is willing to use its military strength and to reduce any net benefit of Fatah violence. In addition, the prospect of future negotiations with Fatah, Israel's primary bargaining partner, may also dictate the timing of Israel's response. Because bargaining strength on either side is a function of past violence, each side has an incentive to have the "last word"
prior to negotiations.
On the other hand, it is less clear what incentives Israel has to react systematically to violence by Hamas and PIJ. These groups are explicitly committed to the destruction of the State of Israel, and are opposed to any negotiated settlement on the basis of territorial concessions. Berrebi and Klor (2005) explicitly assume that the radical groups' behavior is non-strategic and that they always pursue the violent option. If this is so, the timing of Israel's response against
Hamas and PIJ would not necessarily be related to previous actions, even though Israel clearly has incentives to try to incapacitate these groups.
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The difference in Israel's response may also be due to the different organizational and military structure of the different armed groups. The Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades (AAMB) and the Tanzim (the primary armed groups affiliated with Fatah) have a fairly decentralized structure. In its section on the profiles of terrorist organizations, the ICT website describes the AAMB as "a loose network of cells in the main West Bank cities." An attack by the AAMB reveals information about the capabilities and (perhaps) the location of a cell. Because of the decentralized command structure of the AAMB, removing a cell may lead to a longer-term reduction in violence. In contrast, Hamas, in particular, is centrally commanded and well organized. Removing a cell of "foot soldiers" may only lead to the quick replacement of those foot soldiers; Israel has greater incentive to target the leadership of Hamas. An individual attack by Hamas, however, may not reveal any new information about the capabilities or location of that leadership. Because of the large sacrifices it demands of its members, Hamas also may be better able to screen its operatives and ensure loyalty (Berman and Laitin, 2005) , thus making it more difficult to infiltrate the group and extract information on the planners of the attack.
Therefore, Israel's response against Hamas is less likely to be temporally linked to individual attacks claimed by Hamas, and will depend more on intelligence gathering and the opportunity to strike its leaders. 
